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Abstract
Entanglement is a well-known resource in quantum information, in particular it can
be exploited for quantum key distribution (QKD). In this paper we define a two-way
QKD scheme employing GHZ-type states of three qubits obtaining an extension of
the standard E91 protocol with a significant increasing of the number of shared bits.
Eavesdropping attacks can be detected measuring violation of the CHSH inequality
and the secret key rate can be estimated in a device-independent scenario.
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1 Introduction
Quantum processes can be used to distribute a secret key (a random bit-string) in order to use
it as a one-time pad for secure communications [6, 11]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) over
a quantum channel prevents effective eavesdropping attacks exploiting principles of Quantum
Mechanics. An eavesdropper cannot clone an unknown quantum state (no-cloning theorem [18])
thus he extracts information performing measurement processes, the quantum effects of these
measurements can be detected showing that the communication channel is not secure. One of
the most celebrated QKD scheme is the E91 protocol [13] which exploits quantum correlations
of entangled states to share a private key and uses a measure of the violation of Bell inequalities
to check if an eavesdropping occured over the quantum channel.
This paper is devoted to define and analyze a modification of standard E91 protocol based on
preparation and processing of tripartite entangled states. The main idea is defining a two-way
protocol where Bob transmits a half of an entangled state to Alice who entangles the received
state with a third part, as an encoding opeartion, before re-sending it to Bob. Then he perfoms
a decoding to read the information communicated by Alice, after the decoding operation the
clients share a maximally entangled state which can be used to implement a standard E91
protocol as a subroutine. The classical postprocessing is equivalent to that of E91 protocol, so
the security analysis is similar. The advantage w.r.t. to the standard E91 protocol (which can
be described as a one-way protocol) is the doubled length of the secret key at the same cost of
transmitted qubits. Even if an eavesdropper, Eve, can attack each signal twice, we observe that
any Eve’s strategy produces a destruction of quantum correlations which can be taken under
∗d.pastorello@unitn.it
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control by the violation of CHSH inequality. In particular the effect of noise on the secret key
rate can be evaluated in terms of such a violation.
In the next section we recall some basic features of quantum systems that are relevant in the
present discussion, in particular we refer to finite-dimensional case. In the third section there is
a short review on Bell’s inequalities, their physical meaning and relative application in quantum
key distribution (E91 protocol). In the fourth section we describe the proposed QKD scheme as
a two-way extension of the standard E91 protocol based on tripartite entanglement. In the fifth
section we analyze the robustness of the protocol against eavesdropping like intercept/re-send
attacks from a qualitative viewpoint. We show that the security of the protocol is based on
the violation of CHSH inequality and entanglement monogamy. In the sixth section we remark
that an extimation of the secret key rate can be computed in a device-independent scenario
after applying a prescription to purify two-way QKD protocols. In the last section thare are
conclusions and an overview on open issues about the security proof. A technical observation
about the entanglement class of the considered states is given in appendix.
2 Preliminaries and notations
According to standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics, a complex vector space H with inner
product 〈 | 〉 (a Hilbert space) is associated to any quantum system1. If dimH = 2 then the
considered quantum system is called qubit.
Let B(H) be the space of linear operators on H, the set of physical states of the considered
quantum system is defined as:
S(H) := {ρ ∈ B(H) : ρ ≥ 0, trρ = 1}. (1)
S(H) is convex in B(H) and its extremal elements, called pure states, are the rank-1 orthogonal
projectors in H, a non-pure state is called mixed state. Since a pure state ρ can be written as
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| for some unit vector |ψ〉 ∈ H, then pure states can be represented by equivalence
classes of unit vectors where the equivalence relation between |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 is defined by |ψ〉 ∼ |ψ′〉
iff |ψ〉 = eiθ|ψ′〉 for some θ ∈ R. Therefore two unit vectors differing by a multiplicative phase
factor describe the same pure state.
Time evolution of an isolated system is described by a continuous one-parameter group of unitary
operators {U(t)}t∈R+ acting on states. If ρ1 is the state of the system at time t1 and ρ2 is the
state of the system at time t2 > t1 then:
ρ2 = U(t2 − t1)ρ1U∗(t2 − t1). (2)
A measurement process on a quantum system is described by a collection of positive operators
{Ek} satisfying
∑
k Ek = 1¯H
called positive operator-valued measure (POVM), the index k runs
in the set of all possible outcomes of the measurement, so it is a real number. The probability
to measure k when the system is in the state ρ is:
pρ(k) = tr(Ekρ). (3)
If we consider a pure state |ψ〉 then above probability is simply given by pψ(k) = 〈ψ|Ekψ〉.
A special class of POVMs is that of projective valued measures (PVMs) whose elements are
orthogonal projectors Pk, i.e. operators on H satisfying P
∗
k = Pk and P
2
k = Pk. In this case if
the measurement is performed when the state of the system is ρ ∈ S(H) and it produces the
outcome k then the state of the system after the measurement is:
ρ′ =
PkρPk
tr(Pkρ)
, (4)
1We adopt Dirac formalism: A unit vector of the Hilbert space is denoted by the ket |ψ〉, a vector
of dual space is denoted by the bra 〈ψ|, the inner product of two vectors is denoted by 〈ψ|φ〉, the outer
product by |ψ〉〈φ|.
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and a selfadjoint operator on H, called observable, can be defined:
A :=
∑
k
kPk, (5)
so the possible outcomes of the measurement described by the PVM {Pk} are the eigenvalues
of A. If the state of the system is ρ ∈ S(H) then the expectation value of A is
〈A〉ρ =
∑
k
k pρ(k) = tr(Aρ). (6)
Another fundamental quantum feature is the following: If a quantum system is composed by
two subsystems A and B that are respectively described in Hilbert spaces HA and HB , then the
composite system is described in the Hilbert space tensor product HA ⊗ HB .
Quantum systems, in particular qubits, can be exploited as information storages and physical
operations on them can be used for processing and transmitting information. Let H be a 2-
dimensional Hilbert space and (|0〉, |1〉) be an orthonormal basis of H that can be identified as
the standard basis of C2. In the following we call (|0〉, |1〉) the computational basis of H. One
can assume the vectors |0〉 and |1〉 physically represent the eigenstates of a reference observable,
e.g. the rectilinear polarization of a photon described by the Pauli matrix σz. Another basis
of H is given by (|+〉, |−〉) with |+〉 := 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉) and |−〉 := 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉), the vectors
|+〉, |−〉 can be physically interpreted as the eigenstates of circular polarization of a photon for
instance.
Definition 1 Let H be a 2-dimensional Hilbert space and n ∈ N. The Hilbert space H⊗n is
called n-qubit register and any unitary operator acting on H⊗n is called n-qubit quantum
gate.
The Hadamard gate H is a 1-qubit quantum gate defined w.r.t. the computational basis by
H|0〉 := |+〉 and H|1〉 := |−〉 and it is denoted by the symbol:
H (7)
The Hilbert space of a qubit pair is H ⊗ H, with dimH = 2, an orthonormal basis of H ⊗ H
is (|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉), where |00〉 ≡ |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, that we call computational basis of H ⊗ H. A
remarkable 2-qubit gate is the CNOT gate Λ that is defined in the computational basis by:
Λ|00〉 := |00〉 Λ|01〉 := |01〉 Λ|10〉 := |11〉 Λ|11〉 := |10〉, (8)
i.e. Λ acts as the identity when the first qubit is in |0〉 and acts as a bit-flip on the second qubit
when first qubit is in |1〉. The CNOT gate is denoted by the symbol:
• (9)
CNOT gate can be used to define another useful element of a quantum circuit, the SWAP gate:
×
×
:=
•
• •
that switches the input qubits. In the fourth section we define a quantum circuit to entangle
three qubits for our QKD purpose.
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3 CHSH inequality and standard E91 protocol
Let us briefly recall the notions of entanglement, violation of Bell’s inequalities and E91 protocol.
Since composite quantum systems are described in tensor product Hilbert spaces, the definition
of quantum state itself implies that there is a class of quantum states containing non-classical
correlations that are inherently non-local.
Definition 2 Let ρ ∈ S(HA ⊗ HB) be a state of a composite quantum system. ρ is said to be
separable if it can be written as:
ρ =
∑
i
λiρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi (10)
with ρAi ∈ S(HA), ρBi ∈ S(HB), λi ≥ 0 and
∑
i λi = 1. Otherwise it is called entangled.
Entanglement can be interpreted as a non-local property: Consider the entangled pure state of a
qubit pair identified by the vector |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉⊗ |ψ〉+ |1〉⊗ |ϕ〉) ∈ HA⊗HB , if one performs the
PVM-measurement {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} on the first qubit then the state of the second qubit collapses
in |ψ〉 or in |ϕ〉 according to the outcome of the local measurement, this phenomenon occurs
even if the qubits are spacelike separated (EPR paradox [12]). However this non-local feature
cannot be used for communications faster than light (no-communication theorem [15]).
In order to elucidate the content of Bell theorem [4], let us briefly discuss the notion of local
hidden variable theory based on the assumption of local realism. Let us adopt the term local
realism in reference to a pair of properties that a general physical theory can present:
i) Principle of locality : If two events are outside their respective light cones then there is no
causal connection among them.
ii) Counterfactual-definiteness: The values of physical quantities are definite and unaffected by
any measurement process.
Consider a bipartite quantum system composed by a subsystem A and a subsystem B, sup-
pose to perform local measurements on A and B obtaining correlated outcomes when they are
spatially separated. Invoking local realism we are assuming that local measurements are inde-
pendent and do not perturb the systems. So the probability to measure value k ∈ R by a POVM
measurement E on the system A and value l ∈ R by a POVM measurement D on the system B
can be generally expressed by:
p(E, k;D, l) =
∫
X
FE(k, x)FD(l, x)dµ(x), (11)
where (X,µ) is a measure space, x 7→ FE(k, x) and x 7→ FD(l, x) are measurable functions
associated to POVMs E and D. The product FE(k, x)FD(l, x) is the probability to obtain value
k ∈ R by the measurement process E on the first subsystem and value l ∈ R by the measurement
process D on the second subsystem for a fixed value of the parameter x, called hidden variable,
encoding correlations between subsystems.
Definition 3 A quantum state ρ ∈ S(HA ⊗ HB) admits a hidden variable model if for all
POVMs E = {Ek}k ⊂ B(HA) and D = {Dl}l ⊂ B(HB) there exists a measure space (X,µ) and
measurable functions x 7→ FE(k, x) and x 7→ FD(l, x) such that:
tr(ρ(Ek ⊗Dl)) =
∫
X
FE(k, x)FD(l, x)dµ(x). (12)
for any k and l.
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The above definition provides a class of states of a composite quantum system such that in-
troducing a fictious variable x quantum correlations can be treated as classical correlations in
presence of local realism. The set of states admitting a hidden variable model is non-empty, in
particular it contains all separable states.
Proposition 4 Any separable state ρ ∈ S(HA ⊗ HB) admits a hidden variable model.
Proof. If ρ is separable then we have the convex combination:
ρ =
n∑
i=1
λiρ
(A)
i ⊗ ρ(B)i
with ρ
(A)
i ∈ S(HA), ρ(B)i ∈ S(HB). Let be X := {1, 2, 3, ..., n} and µ({i}) := λi. For all POVMs
{Ek}k ∈ B(HA) and {Dl}l ∈ B(HB) let us define:
FE(k, x) := ρ
(A)
x (Ek) , FD(l, x) := ρ
(B)
x (Dl),
obtaining the hidden variable model.
Within a hidden variable model, correlation functions obey to a set of constraints called Bell’s
inequalities. In particular we consider the CHSH-inequality (Clauser, Horne, Shimony, Holt
[17]) to formulate the Bell theorem:
Theorem 5 If a state ρ ∈ S(HA⊗HB) admits a hidden variable model then it satisfies CHSH-
inequality:
|tr[ρ(A⊗ (B −B′))] + tr[ρ(A′ ⊗ (B +B′))]| ≤ 2, (13)
for all A,A′ ∈ B(HA) such that −1
¯HA
≤ A,A′ ≤ 1
¯ HA
and for all B,B′ ∈ B(HB) such that
−1
¯HB
≤ B,B′ ≤ 1
¯HB
.
We have that the violation of CHSH inequality is a sufficient condition for the entanglement
of a state, on the countrary there are entangled states admitting a hidden variable model [16].
A remarkable example of CHSH violation is the following: Consider the Pauli matrices σx and
σz and define the hermitian operators in B(C
2): A := σx, A
′ := σz, B := 1√2(σx + σz), B
′ :=
1√
2
(−σx + σz). Consider the unit vector in C2 ⊗ C2:
|Φ〉 := 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), (14)
i.e. an entangled pure state of a qubit pair. We can calculate the left-hand term of (13) where
ρ = |Φ〉〈Φ|, obtaining by direct inspection:
|〈Φ|A⊗ (B −B′)Φ〉+ 〈Φ|A′ ⊗ (B +B′)Φ〉| = 2
√
2, (15)
then CHSH inequality is violated. More precisely (14) is a maximally entangled state and (15)
is the maximum violation of CHSH inequality (experimentally measured for the first time by
Aspect et al. in 1982 [2]).
The E91 protocol [13] is based on the production of a qubit pair in the maximally entangled
pure state (14) by Alice. Then she sends one qubit of the pair to Bob2. Alice measures one of
the following observables on her qubit:
A1 = σx A2 =
1√
2
(σx + σz) A3 = σz, (16)
2The entangled qubit pair can be produced by an external source (including an eavesdropper) sending
one qubit to Alice and the other one to Bob.
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on the other side Bob measures one of the following observables on his qubit:
B1 =
1√
2
(σx + σz) B2 = σz B3 =
1√
2
(−σx + σz). (17)
If qubits are polarized photons or spin-12 particles then different measurement processes corre-
spond to different horientation angles of Alice and Bob’s analyzers. If Alice and Bob perform
the same measurement process then their outcomes coincide.
Let us summarize E91 protocol as follows:
Step 1: A pair of entangled qubits is produced by Alice. She sends a qubit of the entan-
gled pair to Bob. Alice measures observable Ai with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} on her qubit. Bob measures
observable Bj with j ∈ {1, 2, 3} on his qubit. The procedure is repeated N times.
Step 2: Alice and Bob declare on a classical public channel what observable they have measured
on each qubit. They store the outcomes produced measuring the same observable obtaining two
perfectly correlated bit string (sifted key) of length n ≃ N3 .
Step 3: Alice and Bob declare on a classical public channel the outcomes produced by different
measurements in order to calcuate:
S := |〈Φ|A1 ⊗ (B2 −B3)Φ〉+ 〈Φ|A3 ⊗ (B2 +B3)Φ〉|. (18)
At the end of the round the maximum violation of CHSH inequality is expected S = 2√2. If
the experimental value is S < 2√2 then some measurement process in the middle of quantum
transmission has alterated the state of entangled pairs destroying the quantum correlation, hence
an eavesdropping attack has been detected. However a sifted key may be not discarded even
if S < 2√2, since an estimation of Eve’s information in post-processing could show that the
survived quantum correlations allowed to produced an acceptable secret key. In this regards see
section 6 where some estimations are sketched for the two-way protocol. On the other hand the
extreme case S ≤ 2 entails the ereasure of any quantum correlation.
Obviously a classical authentication protocol must be implemented over the classical channel in
order to ensure that the right person is at the end of the line.
4 The proposed QKD protocol
According to definition 2 a pure state |φ〉〈φ| ∈ S(HA ⊗ HB) is separable if and only if |φ〉 =
|ψA〉 ⊗ |ψB〉 with |ψA〉 ∈ HA and |ψB〉 ∈ HB . More generally: Let {H1, ...,Hn} be a family of
finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. A pure state, represented by |φ〉 ∈ H1⊗ · · · ⊗Hn, is separable
if and only if |φ〉 = |ψ1〉⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψn〉 with |ψi〉 ∈ Hi i = 1, ..., n. Otherwise if |φ〉 is not a product
vector then the corresponding pure state is entangled.
For instance a pure state of three qubits can be separable like |010〉, 2-entangled like |Ψ〉 =
1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)⊗ |1〉 or 3-entangled like |GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉). More precisely pure states
of three qubits a, b, c are divided in six entanglement classes: One class of separable states (a-
b-c), three classes of 2-entangled states (a-bc, b-ac, c-ab) and two classes of 3-entangled states.
These classes correspond to the orbits of the group GL(2,C)⊗3 [9]. Representative elements of
inequivalent classes of genuine tripartite entangled states of three qubits are:
|GHZ〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) and |W 〉 = 1√
3
(|100〉+ |010〉+ |001〉). (19)
In this section we propose a QKD protocol where an entangled state of GHZ-type is prepared
and processed in order to implement an improved version of E91 protocol which is capable of
a superdense key distribution, i.e. the length of the sifted key is double at the same cost of
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standard E91 protocol in terms of the transmitted qubits number.
Consider the Hilbert space H⊗H of a qubit pair, an orthonormal basis can be defined by means
of the Bell states:
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) , ∣∣Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) , (20)
∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) , ∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉) ,
representing the maximally entangled states of two qubits.
Let Σ : H⊗ H→ H⊗ H be a quantum gate defined in the computational basis as follows:
Σ|00〉 := ∣∣Φ+〉 , Σ|11〉 := ∣∣Φ−〉 , Σ|10〉 := ∣∣Ψ+〉 , Σ|01〉 := ∣∣Ψ−〉. (21)
The corresponding graphical represenation is:
× • H •
×
(22)
The simplest quantum gate to construct Bell states is
H • (23)
whose action on the computational basis is |00〉 7→ |Φ+〉, |11〉 7→ |Ψ−〉, |10〉 7→ |Φ−〉 |01〉 7→ |Ψ+〉.
However Σ admits an elementary property that we are going to apply.
Proposition 6 Let Ω : H⊗3 → H⊗3 be the quantum gate defined as Ω := (I ⊗ Σ)(Σ ⊗ I).
Therefore Ω (|ψ〉 ⊗ |Φ+〉) = |Φ+〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 for any |ψ〉 ∈ H.
Proof. Consider |ψ〉 ∈ H decomposed on the computational basis |ψ〉 = a|0〉 + b|1〉, a, b ∈ C.
One can explicitely calculate the action of Ω on |0〉 ⊗ |Φ+〉 and |1〉 ⊗ |Φ+〉:
Ω(|0〉 ⊗ ∣∣Φ+〉) = (I⊗ Σ)(Σ⊗ I) [ 1√
2
(|000〉+ |011〉)
]
=
= (I⊗ Σ)
[
1
2
(|000〉+ |110〉+ |011〉 − |101〉)
]
=
1√
2
(|000〉+ |110〉) = ∣∣Φ+〉⊗ |0〉.
Ω(|1〉 ⊗
∣∣Φ+〉) = (I⊗ Σ)(Σ⊗ I) [ 1√
2
(|100〉+ |111〉)
]
=
= (I⊗ Σ)
[
1
2
(|010〉+ |100〉+ |001〉 − |111〉)
]
=
1√
2
(|001〉+ |111〉) = ∣∣Φ+〉⊗ |1〉.
Hence Ω (|ψ〉 ⊗ |Φ+〉) = |Φ+〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 by linearity.
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Considering three qubits where two are maximally entangled, the action of Ω transfers the state
of the first qubit to the third one entangling the other two. In particular the action of Σ ⊗ I
creates a state where entanglement is distributed over all qubits. So we can assume to encrypt
the state |ψ〉 in a 3-entangled state by application of Σ⊗ I then one can apply I⊗Σ to decrypt
|ψ〉. Since two qubits remain entangled they can be used to check the presence of eavesdroppers
implementing an additional ordinary E91 protocol.
Suppose a client, Bob, prepares a qubit pair in the state |Φ+〉bc ∈ Hb ⊗ Hc sending the qubit b
to Alice and keeping the qubit c in his hands. Meanwhile Alice prepares a qubit in the state
|x〉a ∈ Ha giving rise to the tripartite quantum state |ǫx〉abc := |x〉a ⊗ |Φ+〉bc ∈ Ha ⊗ Hb ⊗ Hc,
where x = 0, 1.
Alice
|x〉 × • H • y Bob
× × • H • y′
|0〉 H •
|0〉 × x
Figure 1. A circuit diagram schematizing the structure of the proposed protocol.
Let A1, A2, A3, B1, B2, B3 be the observables defined in (16) and (17), a QKD protocol can be
realized as follows:
Step 1 Alice and Bob share a quantum state |ǫx〉abc = |x〉a ⊗ |Φ+〉bc, with x = 0, 1 (the qubit
pair ab in Alice’s lab and qubit c in Bob’s lab), by means of the transmission of the qubit b. Then
Alice performs the local operation described by Σ generating the following tripartite entangled
state:
(Σ⊗ I)|ǫx〉abc =


1
2 [|000〉abc + |110〉abc + |011〉abc − |101〉abc] if x = 0
1
2 [|010〉abc + |100〉abc + |001〉abc − |111〉abc] if x = 1
(24)
Step 2 Alice sends the qubit b to Bob. He processes the pair bc with gate Σ.
Step 3 Alice measures the observable Aj , with j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, on the qubit a. Bob measures the
observable Bj with j ∈ {1, 2, 3} on the qubit b and measures the observable B2 on the qubit
c obtaining the outcome x. The value x is stored as a bit of the secret key. The procedure is
repeated N times.
Step 4 Alice and Bob declare over a classical public channel the measured observables recording
the outcomes produced by corresponding measurements. These bits give an additional contri-
bution to the secret key.
Step 5 Alice and Bob declare over a classical public channel the outcomes produced by differ-
ent measurements in order to compute the test statistics (18) detecting eventual eavesdropping
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attacks.
In Appendix we will remark that the state (24) belongs to the GHZ class by the computation
of the Cayley’s hyperdeterminant.
Assuming Steps 1-3 are repeated N times (2N transmitted qubits in total), Alice and Bob share
a bit string of length n ≃ N+ N3 = 4N3 . Otherwise adopting the standard E91 protocol described
in the previous section Alice and Bob share a key of length n ≃ 2N3 by means of the transmission
of 2N qubits.
The cryptographic scheme can be represented by the quantum circuit diagram of Figure 1: The
gate (23), initialized in |00〉, is inserted on the Bob’s side to produce the maximally entangled
state |Φ+〉 that is shared by the clients.
5 Security against eavesdropping: Qualitative analysis
Suppose an eavesdropper (Eve) wants to move an attack in order to gain the private key during
the QKD. Let us show that she cannot gain sufficient information to get the sifted key nor
keeping hidden her attack. Suppose Eve is able to intercept the transmitted qubits over the
quantum channel. Let us exclude the case of a man-in-the-middle attack where Eve plays the
part of Alice for Bob and viceversa sharing two different private keys with the clients because
we are assuming the existence of a standard authentication protocol over the classical channel
that is necessary for the sifting phase and the computation of the test statistic (18).
A general eavesdropping strategy is given by performing a measurement on the first transmitted
qubit and processing the second one in a suitable way. If Eve intercepts the first qubit and
performs the measurement {|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|} then she destroys the entanglement of the pair bc
shared by the clients. More in detail, suppose Eve measures the value 0 then Alice receives the
qubit b in the pure state |0〉 (so Bob’s qubit c collapses in |0〉 as well and Eve can make a copy
of this qubit), by the application of the gate Σ on the separable state |x〉⊗ |0〉 Alice obtains the
state |Φ+〉 if x = 0 or the state |Ψ+〉 if x = 1. Suppose Eve intercepts also the second quantum
transmission (from Alice to Bob), since she does not know the value of x, her knowledge of the
total system is encoded in the following incoherent superposition:
ρEve =
1
2
(∣∣Φ+0〉〈Φ+0∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ+0〉〈Ψ+0∣∣) . (25)
If the state of the three qubits is (25) then Eve cannot gain information about the value of x
(that is a bit of the key) by means of a single measurement process or any local operation on
the qubit pair bc′, where c′ is her copy of the qubit c. However she makes datum x inacessible
to Bob as a minor result, at this stage Eve’s goal is keeping hidden her interference. Therefore
suppose Eve does nothing in order to avoid any perturbation of the quantum transmission from
Alice to Bob. Assuming x = 0 (the case x = 1 is analogue), when Bob performs Σ on the qubit
pair bc then the state of the total system becomes:
(I⊗ Σ)∣∣Φ+0〉 = 1√
2
(∣∣0Φ+〉 + ∣∣1Ψ+〉) , (26)
so when Bob measures the qubit c obtains a randomized value instead of x = 0, however the
reduced state of the qubit pair ab turns out to be:
ρab =
1
2
(∣∣Φ+〉〈Φ+∣∣+ ∣∣Ψ+〉〈Ψ+∣∣) , (27)
that is a separable state, in fact it can be written as a convex combination of separable pure
states: ρab =
1
2(|++〉〈++| + |−−〉〈−−|). As a consequence Eve’s measurements on the first
transmitted qubit (from Bob to Alice) can be detected by the computation of test statistic even
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if no operation is performed on the second transmitted qubit (from Alice to Bob). On the other
hand Eve can intercept qubit b once again (after Alice’s processing) and perform some opera-
tion to hyde her attack during the previous quantum transmission. However any local operation
performed by Eve cannot entangle the qubit b (to be re-transmitted to Bob) with the qubit c of
Bob so the computation of test statistic reveals an interception over the quantum channel.
Another general eavesdropping strategy is entangling the intercepted qubits with a probe quan-
tum system in Eve’s hands. Assume Eve intercepts the first transmitted qubit and acts with an
entangler, i.e. a quantum operation on the bipartite system made by the intercepted qubit and
an ancillary system (the probe) producing an entangled state. So the goal of Eve is entangling a
probe with Alice and Bob’s systems in order to gain the values of datum x (i.e. 3/4 of the secret
key at the end of the round) performing measurements only on her system leaving correctly
correlated Alice and Bob’s qubits. This goal is unattainable because of entanglement monogamy
that can be expressed by CKW inequality [7]: If two quantum systems A and B are maximally
entangled then A or B cannot be entangled with a third system C. So when Alice receives
the first qubit after the action of Eve’s entangler, it cannot be maximally entangled with Bob’s
qubit as provided by the protocol then CHSH inequality cannot be maximally violated. On the
other hand if Eve wants to gain the value of x she must perfectly entangle the intercepted qubit
with the probe destroying the quantum correlation with the Bob’s qubit at all.
6 Security against eavesdropping: Quantitative estimates
After a qualitative discussion on intercept/re-send attacks let us quantify the security of the
protocol within a general device-independent scenario. Hence we assume that any element of
the QKD scheme is completely untrusted, i.e. Eve may have fabricated the measuring devices
of Alice and Bob in addition to controlling the entanglement source. So Alice and Bob can
estimate Eve’s information only by qubit error rate Q and violation S of CHSH inequality.
The qubit error rate is given by the weighted sum of the probabilities of mismatching outcomes:
Q =
1
8
p(a2 6= b1) + 1
8
p(a3 6= b2) + 3
4
p(x 6= xb), (28)
where ai are the measurement outcomes of Ai obtained by Alice, bj are the outcomes of Bj
measured on qubit b and xb is the outcome of B2 measured on qubit c by Bob. Then normalized
mutual information between Alice and Bob is:
IAB = 1−H(Q), (29)
where H is the binary entropy function.
In order to eavaluate the secret key rate of the protocol, we can consider the purified version of
the protocol applying lemma 1 in [3]. When Alice receives the qubit from Bob, she acts with an
encoding (given by the processing with the gate Σ for a fixed value of the parameter x) before
re-sending the qubit. In the purified setting, the encoding operation (described by the action a
completely positive trace-preserving map) is equivalent as a POVM-measurement (with binary
outcome) performed on the received state with the half of an entangled state so that, after the
measurement, the other half corresponds to the encoded state to be sent to Bob. Hence, within
the purified version of the protocol, we can assume that a pure state |Ψ〉ABE ∈ HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE
is shared among Alice, Bob and Eve and dimensions of HA and HB are unknown to Alice
and Bob but fixed by Eve according to the device-independent assumption. Alice performs a
measurement processMA (representing the encoding) and another oneM(Aj) (corresponding to
the measurement of Aj) on two subspaces of HA, on the other side Bob performs his measurement
M(Bj) ⊗M(B2). All the measurement processes are defined by Eve who controls the devices.
The measurement MA produces two possible outcomes that are assumed to be correlated to the
outcomes of M(B2) then the purified protocol is equivalent to E91 protocol where the involved
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measurement processes are EAj :=MA ⊗M(Aj) and EBj :=M(Bj)⊗M(B2), for j = 1, 2, 3.
In order to estimate the accessible information to Eve we consider the Holevo quantity χEB
between Eve and Bob. Since our purified protocol turns out to be a modification of E91 protocol
within the device-independent scenario, then χEB is completely characterized by the violation
S of CHSH inequality and applying the main result of [1] we have:
χEB ≤ H
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
. (30)
The secret key rate r is lower-bounded by Devetak-Winter rate rDW [8]:
r ≥ rDW = IAB − χEB, (31)
where IAB is given by (29) and χBE is constrained by (30). Under assumption of device-
independence, we can provide the following secret key rate for the presented protocol:
r ≥ 1−H(Q)−H
(
1 +
√
(S/2)2 − 1
2
)
. (32)
According to the first analysis of the protocol in section 4, the ratio between the length of the
secret key and the total number of the transmitted qubit is:
R =
2
3
r, (33)
which attains the maximum for Q = 0 and S = 2√2.
Summarizing: The two-way protocol can be purified applying lemma 1 in [3], so that the scheme
can be described within a device-independent scenario where Alice and Bob share a pure state
with Eve. They perform local measurements on their states like in E91 protocol, under collective
attacks (i.e. Eve moves the same attack to each system of Alice and Bob) the Holevo quantity
between Bob and Eve can be evaluated in terms of violation of CHSH inequality.
7 Conclusions and open issues
In this paper we have described a two-way QKD protocol based on the preparation and process-
ing of tripartite GHZ-type entangled states. A quantum circuit has been defined to entangle
three qubits in order to implement a quantum transmission where the receiver measures two
distinct outcomes: The value of a fixed bit and another value to compute the test statistic to
quantifying violation of CHSH inequality like within the ordinary E91 protocol. The maximum
violation shows that no eavesdropping attack occurred like in the standard picture. In the ideal
case of no eavesdropping and no noise at all the length of the sifted key is n ≃ 23N , where N
is the total number of transmitted qubits, instead of n ≃ N3 . Moreover we have focused on the
security of the QKD scheme with a qualitative and a semi-quantitative analysis. Eve cannot
perform any operation to gain the values of the datum x or disturb the key distribution without
introducing local realism in the system. The monogamy of entanglement prevents any perfectly
hidden eavesdropping attack which is moved entangling intercepted qubits with an auxiliary sys-
tem. In order to evaluate the trade-off between secret key rate and noise we have considered the
purification of the protocol which allow us to analyze the security within a device-independent
scenario where Alice, Bob and Eve share a pure state and the only figures of merit to estimate
the secret key rate are the qubit error rate and the violation of CHSH inequality. Altough we
presented a lower bound for the secret key rate in a device-independent scenario, further work
is needed to reach a complete and satisfactory security proof of the protocol. In this regard an
interesting direction of investigation could be the estimation of the effects of noise, modeled by
depolarizing channels and decoherence channels, on the security.
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Appendix
As a technical observation let us remark that the entangled states (Σ⊗ I2)|ǫ0〉 and (Σ⊗ I2)|ǫ1〉,
defined in (24), belong to the same entanglement class, in fact they are related by means of the
invertible local operation I2 ⊗ σx ⊗ I2.
Proposition 7 The pure state (24) belongs to the entanglement class of the state GHZ.
Proof. If we consider a pure state |Ψ〉 = ∑1i=0 aijk|ijk〉 of three qubits, the Cayley’s hyperde-
terminant of its coefficients hypermatrix is defined as:
Det(|Ψ〉) := a2000a2111 + a2001a2110 + a2100a2011 − 2[a000a001a110a111 + a010a101a101a111+
+a000a011a100a111 + a001a010a101a110 + a001a011a101a100 + a010a011a101a100]+
+4[a000a011a101a100 + a001a010a100a111].
We have Det [(Σ⊗ I2)|ǫx〉abc] = 1 for x = 0, 1. The Cayley’s hyperdeterminat is invariant
under the action of SL(2,C)⊗3 [10], then the property Det 6= 0 is invariant under the action
of GL(2,C)⊗3. Since Det(|W 〉) = 0 and Det(|GHZ〉) = 1/4 we can conclude that (24) is a
GHZ-type state.
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